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POLICE REPUTATION DIPS
According to a recent online survey conducted by 
Leger, the reputation of Canada’s police has dropped 
since the last time the survey was taken. The latest 
survey, released in June 2020, showed more people 
in the prairie provinces and Quebec had a good 
opinion of their local police service  (LPS) compared 
to those in Ontario and BC.  
Highlights
• Overall, 47% of Canadians had a good opinion
of their LPS, while 12% had a bad opinion. 35%
didn’t know their LPS well enough to have an
opinion while 5% didn’t know their LPS at all.
• 74% trusted their LPS (up from 73% in 2019)
while only 58% trusted their local police chief
(down from 59% in 2019).
• 71% were satisfied with their LPS (down from
72% in 2019) while 68% believed their LPS was
committed to meeting their expectations (up from
65% in 2019).
• 63% believed their LPS was honest/transparent
and 63% felt their LPS was concerned about
people like them.
• 61% felt that people like them were represented
on their LPS while only 24% believed they could
influence the decisions or direction of their LPS.
• Seniors (>65 years) were more likely to have a
good opinion of and be satisfied with their LPS
than those  under 65. Visible minorities were less
likely.
• There was a growing unfamiliarity with a LPS. In
2020, 40% of Canadians were unfamiliar with
their LPS compared to 33% in 2019 and 32% in
2018.
Source: Police Reputation
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Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Achievement orientation: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson & Vanessa Druskat.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.4
Adaptability: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson, Vanessa Druskat & George Kohlrieser.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.3
Arrows in a quiver: Indigenous-Canadian 
relations from contact to the courts.
James Frideres.
Regina, SK: University of Regina Press, 2019.
E 92 F75 2019
Coach and mentor: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, George 
Kohlrieser, Michele Nevarez & Matthew Taylor.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.9
Conflict management: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Amy Gallo, 
George Kohlrieser, Matthew Lippincott & George 
Pitagorsky.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.10
Emotional self-awareness: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson, Vanessa Druskat & George Kohlrieser.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.1
Emotional self control: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson, Vanessa Druskat, George Kohlrieser.
Florence, MA : More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.2
Empathy: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson, Vanessa Druskat, George Kohlrieser.
Florence, MA : More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.6
Influence: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Vanessa  Druskat, 
Matthew Lippincott, Peter Senge & Matthew Taylor.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.8
Inspirational leadership: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Mette Miriam Boell, Richard 
Boyatzis, Claudio Fernandez-Araoz, Matthew 
Lippincott, Annie McKee &  Matthew Taylor.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.12
Organizational awareness: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Vanessa  Druskat, 
Michele Nevarez & George Pitagorsky.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.7
Positive outlook: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Richard J. 
Davidson & Vanessa Druskat.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.5
Researching legislative intent: a practical guide.
Susan Barker & Erica Anderson.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2019.
KE 482 S84 B37 2019
Teamwork: a primer.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Vanessa  Druskat, 
Matthew Lippincott & Ann Flanagan Petry.
Florence, MA: More Than Sound LLC, 2017.
BF 576 G65 2017 v.11
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visit the following link.
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DIVIDED SUPREME COURT 
MAINTAINS STATUS QUO ON 
ENTRAPMENT DOCTRINE
R. v. Ahmad; R. v. Williams, 2020 SCC 11
The police, in two cases, relied on a  single tip of 
unknown reliability to call a phone number and 
make a meet to purchase drugs. In both cases the 
accused brought entrapment applications following 
their convictions. 
R. v. Ahmad: A police officer received 
information from a  colleague that a 
person named “Romeo” was selling 
drugs using a specified phone 
number. The officer called the 
number without investigating the reliability of the 
information or how the other officer had procured 
the number. The following conversation took place:
The male called the officer back later the  same day 
and they had the following conversation:
The officer went to the meeting place, called the 
number again, met the accused Ahmad, and 
exchanged  $140 for two small plastic bags of 
cocaine. Police arrested Ahmad and searched him. 
They found an envelope with the handwritten word 
“Romeo” on it containing cash, the $140, the cell 
phone that had been used to set up the transaction, 
and two small bags of powder cocaine. In Ahmad’s 
backpack, the police found a large quantity of 
cocaine and three envelopes containing cash.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Ahmad was convicted on one count of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and two counts of possessing 
the proceeds of crime. The trial judge 
rejected Ahmad’s stay application on the basis of 
entrapment. Although the judge found the  police 
did not have a reasonable suspicion the person on 
the other end of the phone call was trafficking in 
drugs before placing the call, the officer built a 
reasonable suspicion that “Romeo” was trafficking 
drugs during the call. This reasonable suspicion 
arose before Ahmad was offered the opportunity to 
commit a crime when a  specific quantity of 
powdered cocaine was requested. 
R. v. Williams: A drug squad detective 
received an information package from 
another officer about “Jay,” who was 
allegedly  selling cocaine in a certain 
area in Toronto. The package 
identified “Jay” as the accused Williams and 
included a collection of information about him: an 
address at which he had allegedly been trafficking 
drugs, a description of his physical appearance, a 
Officer Hey, It’s Mike, Matt said I can give you 
a call, this is Romeo?
Male He did, did he?
Officer Yeah, said you can help me out?
Male What do you need?
Officer Two soft. [meaning two grams of 
powder cocaine]
Male Hold on, I’ll get back to you.
Officer Alright.
Officer Hello.
Male So what do you need again?
Officer Two soft, where you at?
Male Can meet you at Yorkdale.
Officer Sure, $160 good an hour?
Male $140, hours good, go by theatres.
Officer Cool.
Volume 20 Issue 3 ~ May/June 2020
PAGE 6
note that he was a “cocaine dealer” who worked in 
a certain area, and a home address. The tip did not 
disclose how Williams was connected to the name 
“Jay” or the currency of the information. The 
detective had been involved in Williams’ arrest 20 
months earlier for trafficking cocaine, although he 
ultimately pled guilty to simple possession. But the 
detective had not known him to use the name “Jay.” 
Another officer called the number and the 
following conversation occurred:
The officer later met Williams and exchanged $80 
for the crack cocaine. Eleven days later a second 
purchase was made. The following month Williams 
was arrested.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Although Williams agreed the evidence 
established his guilt on two counts of 
cocaine trafficking and two counts of 
possessing proceeds of crime, the trial 
judge found police  lacked a reasonable suspicion 
before providing him with the opportunity to 
commit a crime. The words “I need 80”  — referring 
to $80 of cocaine — constituted an opportunity to 
traffic because it involved a request for a  specific 
amount of a specific type of drug. A stay  of 
proceedings was entered. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Ahmad appealed his conviction 
while the Crown appealed the 
stay of proceedings in Williams’ 
case. The Court of Appeal heard 
both challenges together. Two judges of the Court 
of Appeal concluded that entrapment had not been 
made out in either case. As long as the  police  had a 
reasonable suspicion related to a phone number 
itself, the police  were permitted to provide an 
opportunity to commit a crime to a person 
associated with the number. It was not necessary 
for the  police to harbour a reasonable suspicion 
about the person who actually 
answered the phone . The 
majority dismissed Ahmad’s 
a p p e a l a n d u p h e l d h i s 
conviction, while at the same 
time granted the  Crown’s appeal 
in the Williams’ matter, entered 
convictions and remitted the case 
to the trial court for sentencing.  
A third judge agreed with the result decided by the 
majority, but disagreed with its differentiation 
between reasonable suspicion over a phone 
number and reasonable suspicion over the 
individual who answered that phone. In his view, 
the police in both cases acted on a reasonable 
suspicion that Ahmad and Williams were already 
engaged in criminal activity when they presented 
them with an opportunity to commit an 
offence.  There was no need to consider the bona 
fide inquiry prong.
Male Hello.
Officer Jay?
Male Yeah.
Officer You around?
Male Who is this?
Officer It’s Vinny.
Male Vinny who?
Officer Vinny. Jesse from Queen and Jarvis gave 
me your name. . .your number. Said you 
could help me out. I need 80. [slang for 
a dollar amount]
Male Okay. You have to come to me.
Officer Okay.Where?
Male Queen and Dufferin.
Officer Okay. It’ll take me a few because I’m at 
Yonge & Bloor.
Male Okay, hurry up.
Officer I’ll call you when I get there.
Male Okay. What you want, soft or hard.
Officer Hard. Hard buddy.
Male Okay.
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Supreme Court of Canada
Both Ahmad and 
Williams appealed 
their convictions 
before a  full nine 
member panel of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court was split 5:4 in deciding how 
the entrapment doctrine should be applied in 
Canada. Five judges maintained the status quo 
regarding the law of entrapment as it applied to the 
investigation of suspected dial-a-dope operations in 
which drug traffickers use a cell phone to connect 
with their customers and sell illicit drugs. Four 
judges sought to develop and change the law. 
Entrapment
Justices Karakatsanis, Brown and Martin wrote the 
opinion for the majority. Upon introducing the 
entrapment doctrine, the justices stated:
• “As state actors, police must respect the rights 
and freedoms of all Canadians and be 
accountable to the public they serve and 
protect. At the same time, police require various 
investigative techniques to enforce  the criminal 
law. While  giving wide latitude to police to 
investigate crime in the public interest, the law 
also imposes constraints on certain police 
methods.”
• “Where [the police step beyond their normal 
investigative role and tempt people into 
committ ing criminal offences] without 
reasonable suspicion, or where they go further 
and induce the commission of a criminal 
offence, they commit entrapment. Without a 
requirement of reasonable suspicion, the police 
could target individuals at random, thereby 
invading people’s privacy, exposing them to 
temptation and generating crimes that would not 
otherwise have occurred. Such conduct 
threatens the  rule of law, undermines society’s 
sense of decency, justice  and fair play, and 
amounts to an abuse  of the legal process of such 
significance that, where it is shown to have 
occurred, a stay of proceedings is required.”
• “[P]olice cannot offer a person who answers a 
cell phone the opportunity to commit an offence 
without having formed reasonable suspicion that 
the person using that phone, or that phone 
number, is engaged in criminal activity. Whether 
the police are targeting a person, place or phone 
number, the legal standard for entrapment is a 
uniform one, requiring reasonable suspicion in 
all cases where police provide an opportunity  to 
commit a  criminal offence. Reasonable 
suspicion is a familiar legal standard that 
provides courts with the necessary objective 
basis on which to determine whether the police 
have justified their actions. A bare tip from an 
unverified source that someone is dealing drugs 
from a phone number cannot ground reasonable 
suspicion.”
The majority also noted that entrapment is not a 
substantive defence leading to an acquittal. Rather, 
it an abuse of process which disentitles the 
Crown to a conviction with the appropriate remedy 
being a stay of proceedings so that the 
administration of justice would not be brought into 
disrepute.
There are two alternative branches to entrapment:
1. Opportunity Based Entrapment: The 
police provide an opportunity for a person to 
commit an offence  without reasonable suspicion 
or without acting in the  course of a bona fide 
inquiry. In other words, the police may provide 
“As state actors, police must respect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians and 
be accountable to the public they serve and protect. At the same time, police 
require various investigative techniques to enforce the criminal law. While giving 
wide latitude to police to investigate crime in the public interest, the law also 
imposes constraints on certain police methods.”
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an opportunity to commit a crime when they 
have a reasonable suspicion that a  specific 
person is engaged in criminal activity 
(individualized suspicion prong) or they have a 
reasonable suspicion people are carrying out 
criminal activity at a  specific location or place 
(bona fide inquiry prong). In the digital age, a 
phone number or other virtual means of 
communication, such as a message board on a 
website can qualify as a “place” as long as it 
can be precisely and narrowly defined. 
However, “entire  websites or social media 
platforms will rarely, if  ever, be sufficiently 
particularized to support reasonable suspicion.” 
 
2. Inducement Based Entrapment: The 
police, having a reasonable  suspicion or acting 
in the course of a bona fide inquiry, go beyond 
providing  an opportunity  and induce the 
commission of an offence. 
Why Reasonable Suspicion?
Both the individualized and bona fide enquiry 
branches are premised upon and tethered to 
reasonable suspicion. An objective  reasonable 
suspicion standard is important for several reasons 
including:
• It “ensures courts can conduct meaningful 
judicial review of what the police knew at the 
time the opportunity was provided.”
• It “requires the police to disclose the basis for 
their belief and to show that they had legitimate 
reasons related to criminality for targeting an 
individual or the  people  associated with a 
location.” 
• It “allows for exacting curial scrutiny of police 
conduct for conformance to the [Charter] and 
society’s sense of decency, justice, and fair play 
because it requires objectively discernible facts.”
• “Courts must be able to assess the extent to 
which the police, in seeking to form reasonable 
suspicion over a person or a place, rely upon 
overtly discriminatory or stereotypical thinking, 
or upon ‘intuition’ or ‘hunches’ that easily 
disguise unconscious racism and stereotyping.”
• “Requiring  reasonable  suspicion before 
tempting individuals into committing crimes 
also reflects Canadian law’s cautious approach 
to the expansion of police powers.”
• “Providing individuals the opportunity to 
commit offences without the foundation of a 
reasonable suspicion also unacceptably 
increases the likelihood that people will commit 
crimes when they otherwise would not have.”
• “Reasonable suspicion insists on an objective 
assessment of the information the police 
actually had. Reasonable suspicion thus shifts 
the p ro tec t ion o f the pub l ic aga ins t 
unreasonable intrusions from the shadows of 
police discretion to the light of curial scrutiny.” 
• “Reasonable suspicion is an ex ante standard 
that has stood the test of time ... [and it] fosters 
in police officers a  sense of the importance of 
obtaining objective evidence of criminal activity 
before offering an opportunity to commit a 
crime, and of being alive to indicators that 
suggest that their intuitions or hunches may be 
wrong. And it compels police to disclose 
objective evidence that is amenable to exacting 
review, precluding them from relying on 
peremptory assertions of suspicion.”
“[P]olice cannot offer a person who answers a cell phone the opportunity to 
commit an offence without having formed reasonable suspicion that the person 
using that phone, or that phone number, is engaged in criminal activity. Whether 
the police are targeting a person, place or phone number, the legal standard for 
entrapment is a uniform one, requiring reasonable suspicion in all cases where 
police provide an opportunity to commit a criminal offence.”
“Reasonable suspicion insists on an 
objective assessment of the 
information the police actually 
had.”
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What is Reasonable Suspicion?
The majority described reasonable suspicion as 
follows:
• “Reasonable suspicion is, by definition, an 
objective standard that protects individuals’ 
interests and preserves the rule of law by 
ensuring courts can meaningfully review police 
conduct. For this reason, it is fundamental to 
restraining the power of police to provide 
opportunities to commit crimes.” 
• “[R]easonable suspicion is not ‘unduly 
onerous’. As a lower standard than reasonable 
grounds, it allows police  additional flexibility  in 
enforcing the law and preventing crime. In the 
entrapment doctrine, reasonable suspicion 
emerges from the first branch’s concern with 
police behaviour that falls short of actually 
inducing an offence, yet nonetheless constitutes 
police involvement in the commission of a 
crime.”
• “While the reasonable suspicion standard 
requires only the possibility, rather than 
probability, of criminal activity, it must also be 
remembered that it provides police officers with 
ju s t i f i ca t ion to engage in o the rwi se 
impermissible, intrusive conduct such as 
searches and detentions. It is therefore subject 
to ‘rigorous,’ ‘independent’ and ‘exacting’ 
judicial scrutiny.”
• “The suspicion must be focused, precise, 
reasonable, and based in ‘objective facts that 
stand up to independent scrutiny’.”
• “[T]he evidence said to satisfy reasonable 
suspicion must be carefully examined.”
• “Al though innocent explanat ions and 
exculpatory information remain relevant to an 
assessment of reasonable suspicion, the police 
are not required to undertake further 
investigation to rule out those explanations. 
Nevertheless, the facts must indicate  the 
possibility of criminal behaviour: characteristics 
that apply  broadly to innocent people are not 
markers of criminal activity. Mere hunches and 
intuition will not suffice. However, an officer’s 
training or experience can make otherwise 
equivocal information probative of the presence 
of criminal activity.”
• “Reasonable suspicion is also individualized, in 
the sense that it picks an individual target — 
whether a person, an intersection or a phone 
number — out of a group of persons or places.”
• “The target to which reasonable suspicion must 
attach varies with the context.” 
• “[R]easonable suspicion cannot be grounded on 
a bald tip alone.”
Reasonable Suspicion & the Dial-a-
Dope Context
There are two ways in which the police can 
acquire  reasonable suspicion prior to offering  an 
opportunity to a dial-a-doper to commit an 
offence: (1) before making the call or (2) during the 
call.
Before Making the Call
The police can take various steps upon receiving a 
tip to establish reasonable suspicion that an 
individual or phone number is associated with 
dial-a-dope activity before they call the number:
Police may wait to see if more tips are received 
about the same person or phone number. 
Police may cross-reference the person’s name 
or phone number to find other connections 
between it and criminal activity. Police may 
also consider any details contained in the tip 
or, if known, the reliability of the informant. 
For example, does the source have a criminal 
record? How long have the police used the 
“While the reasonable suspicion standard requires only the possibility, rather 
than probability, of criminal activity, it must also be remembered that it provides 
police officers with justification to engage in otherwise impermissible, intrusive 
conduct such as searches and detentions.”
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source? Has the source provided credible tips 
in the past? Is there a possible motivation for 
giving a false tip? Is the source’s information 
first-hand? [references omitted, para. 51]
During the call
The police can establish the necessary reasonable 
suspicion in the course of a conversation with the 
target, but prior to presenting the opportunity to 
commit a crime:
[T]he target’s responsiveness to details in the 
tip, along with other factors, may tend to 
confirm the tip’s reliability. For example, the 
target’s use of or response to language 
particular to the drug subculture properly forms 
part of the constellation of factors supporting 
r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n . E ve n s o , t h e 
understanding of “coded” drug language by a 
target is not, on its own, necessarily a reliable 
ground for reasonable suspicion. Some phrases 
admit of innocent interpretation. And some 
people — especially vulnerable people — are 
simply familiar with the coded language of 
drug trafficking ... 
[...]
Whether or not responding to such terminology 
is neutral or adds to the weight of other factors 
will depend on the circumstances. There is no 
requirement that the police rule out innocent 
explanations for these responses. But by the 
same token, the more general the language 
used, the more the need for specific evidence 
regarding police experience and training. In 
particular, where a police officer testifies that a 
generic or everyday phrase is indicative of 
involvement in the drug trade, a trial judge 
must carefully consider whether this is a 
reasonable connection to make, based on 
rigorous scrutiny of all the evidence, including 
any other factors said to establish reasonable 
suspicion. Moreover, if the target seems 
confused by the officer’s use of such language, 
such exculpatory information must be taken 
into account as part of the “entirety of the 
circumstances”. Courts must keep in mind that 
relevant factors are not to be parsed separately 
and assessed individually to determine whether 
they support reasonable suspicion. Rather, they 
are assessed together and in light of each other.
To conclude, an objective assessment 
rigorously safeguards several rights that are 
engaged in the entrapment context: to liberty, 
to privacy, to be left alone, and to equality. 
Reasonable suspicion is the minimum objective 
standard the Court has chosen to protect these 
essential rights. At the same time, it also allows 
police the flexibility necessary to enforce the 
criminal law against crimes that are difficult to 
investigate. [references omitted, para. 55-57]
If the police do not form a reasonable suspicion 
before a  phone call is made, a court will review the 
words spoken during the call to determine whether 
the police had a reasonable suspicion before 
offering an opportunity to commit a crime (eg., 
made a specific request to purchase drugs). 
“Reasonable suspicion is not formed retroactively,” 
said the majority. “Rather, it is applied 
prospectively. ... Reasonable suspicion — like any 
level of investigative justification — can justify an 
action only on the basis of information already 
known to police” :
A court must examine all of the circumstances, 
and not merely the language used during the 
call, in order to determine whether police had 
formed reasonable suspicion by the time the 
opportunity was provided. In dial-a-dope cases, 
conversations are a means of forming a 
reasonable suspicion and the means of 
committing the offence itself. Given that police 
cannot verify the identities of their interlocutors 
when operating in a virtual world, determining 
“Reasonable suspicion is not formed retroactively. Rather, it is applied 
prospectively. From its inception, the entrapment doctrine has required that 
police officers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before providing an 
opportunity to commit an offence. Reasonable suspicion — like any level of 
investigative justification — can justify an action only on the basis of 
information already known to police.”
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when a target is provided with an opportunity 
to make an offer to traffic unavoidably requires 
that courts scrutinize the language used. This is 
a common basis upon which police make 
professional judgment calls about what actions 
are legally permitted. It is also the basis upon 
which courts review the legality of those 
actions. Examining the language used may 
reveal, as it does in the cases at bar, the 
difference between an officer who is 
investigating whether there is reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity through careful 
attention to the answers received, and an 
officer who makes no serious attempt to verify 
a tip of unknown reliability and immediately 
asks for drugs.
In sum, if police have not been able to establish 
reasonable suspicion prior to making the call, 
then inevitably courts will have to scrutinize 
the precise wording of the call. Of course, the 
preferable course of action — and the most 
sure way to avoid curial “parsing” — is for 
police to form reasonable suspicion prior to 
making the call. In our view, these two avenues 
strike an appropriate balance: they afford 
police sufficient latitude, while also protecting 
Canadians from unwarranted invitations to 
commit an offence. ... [paras. 61-62]
The majority cautioned, however, that the “police 
must be aware that in placing the call without 
reasonable suspicion, they are walking on thin ice, 
having already intruded upon the private life of 
their interlocutor.”
What’s an Opportunity to Traffic?
Whether or not police  action constitutes an 
opportunity to commit crime depends on the 
definition of the offence and the context in which 
the action occurred. “In a conversation, an 
opportunity will be established when an 
affirmative response to the question posed by the 
officer could satisfy the material elements of an 
offence,”  said the majority. “In the dial-a-dope 
context, in which the initial interaction between 
the police and target occurs entirely over the 
phone, the exercise centres on determining 
whether words spoken by the police  officer 
constitute an opportunity to commit drug 
trafficking.”
Under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) drug trafficking  not only includes the 
selling of drugs but also the offer to do so. An 
opportunity to commit an offence is offered when 
the officer says something to which the accused 
can commit an offence by simply answering “yes.” 
But a general agreement to sell “drugs” or 
“product” will not suffice unless there  are 
contextual markers that narrow what is intended to 
a particular drug  listed in those schedules. Thus, 
“police can make exploratory requests of the 
target, including asking whether they sell drugs, 
without providing an opportunity to traffic in 
illegal drugs. An opportunity has been provided 
only  when the terms of the deal have narrowed to 
the point that the request is for a specific type of 
drug and, therefore, the target can commit an 
offence by simply agreeing to provide what the 
officer has requested. In some cases, a request to 
purchase a specific quantity of drugs will suffice.” 
The majority rejected the Crown’s submission that 
the opportunity to commit the offence does not 
arise when the agreement to sell drugs is secured 
during the call but only occurs when the police 
officer meets the suspect in person and makes the 
in-person transaction. 
Was the accused Ahmad entrapped?
No. Asking whether Ahmad could “help [him] 
out” was not an opportunity to traffic  in drugs. 
Responding “yes”  to that question would not have 
been trafficking because the inquiry had not been 
narrowed to a particular substance listed in a CDSA 
schedule. But an opportunity to commit drug 
trafficking was provided when the officer asked 
Ahmad for “two soft” — whether he  would sell two 
grams of cocaine. However, a  reasonable suspicion 
had already crystallized when the accused asked 
the officer, “What do you need?” By then:
• The officer referenced both “Romeo” and the 
police’s concocted “drop name” Matt. The 
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accused was not surprised and did not deny he 
was Romeo or ask who Matt was. Rather, he 
continued to engage the caller to ascertain what 
he wanted. 
• The officer was allowed to rely  on what he knew 
of illicit drug transactions. As well, the accused’s 
response — “What do you need?”  — to a 
request that he “help . . . out”  a stranger was 
also relevant. The question and answer could 
not be assessed in isolation. Although the 
answer “What do you need?”  to the question 
“[Y]ou can help me out?” can admit of innocent 
responses, the reasonable suspicion standard 
did not require  the police to direct the 
conversation to rule out innocent explanations 
for Ahmad’s positive response. The officer was 
entitled to consider all of the circumstances in 
forming a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual with whom he was speaking was 
engaged in drug trafficking.
The majority agreed with the trial judge that these 
factors, taken together, disclosed a reasonable 
possibility that the individual was involved in drug 
trafficking. Ahmad’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Was the accused Williams entrapped?
Yes. As soon as the person who answered the 
phone confirmed he was “Jay” the specific request 
for a particular quantity of that drug (i.e., “I need 
80”), where the  police were working from a tip that 
the individual was a cocaine dealer, constituted an 
opportunity. Once Williams responded “Okay”, the 
offence of trafficking was complete. “[The officer] 
did not wait to see how Williams would respond to 
an investigative  question that could have 
corroborated that Williams was engaged in 
criminal activity prior to providing the opportunity 
to commit the crime,” said the majority. “This 
means Williams did not respond positively to slang 
particular to the drug subculture until after the 
opportunity had been provided. That one aspect of 
a tip has been corroborated — here, ‘Jay’s’ name 
— does not allow that tip to ground a reasonable 
suspicion. The corroboration of the name does not 
strengthen the reliability of the  tip ‘in its assertion 
of illegality’.” 
In this case, police appear to have proceeded 
on the assumption that the tip — that Jay was 
trafficking in cocaine using the phone number 
provided — was about Williams. But there was 
no evidence to establish that the source 
connected Jay with Williams. Nor did the 
evidence establish any other basis upon which 
to conclude they were the same person. 
Indeed, the officer who had previously dealt 
with Williams said she had not known him to 
use the name “Jay.” While the report itself 
asserted a connection between the two, there 
was no evidence to show whether such a 
connection was warranted or reasonable. In the 
absence of such evidence, this Court cannot 
simply presume that a bald tip that Jay was 
using a particular phone number to traffic in 
cocaine was reliable and current. Confirmation 
that the speaker was Jay confirmed only that 
aspect of the tip — that Jay was using that 
phone. There was no confirmation that he was 
using the phone to sell cocaine until after the 
police off icer provided him with the 
opportunity to do so. The only conclusion that 
can be safely drawn from the record as it stands 
is ... the police had no more than a bare tip that 
someone using a particular phone number was 
selling drugs and this did not ground 
reasonable suspicion. [para. 84]
Williams’ appeal was allowed, his convictions were 
set aside and the  stay of proceedings was 
reinstated.  
A Different Approach
A four member minority would have revised the 
bona fide inquiry branch of the entrapment 
doctrine to allow police to provide an opportunity 
to commit a crime by only requiring  “a factually-
g r o u n d e d i nve s t i g a t i o n i n t o a t i g h t l y 
circumscribed area, whether physical or virtual, 
that is motivated by genuine law enforcement 
purposes”. Reasonable suspicion would no longer 
be required. Justice Moldaver, speaking for the 
minority, described the revised bona fide inquiry 
framework as follows:
1. The police investigation must be motivated 
by genuine law enforcement purposes. An 
investigation that is pursued in bad faith will not 
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be one that is motivated by genuine law 
enforcement purposes. For example, bad faith 
conduct could include an investigation 
motivated by racial profiling  or based on 
information from a known unreliable  source. 
Bad faith could also involve  police targeting 
marginalized vulnerable individuals, such as 
those previously involved in the drug trade or 
addicted to drugs, but whom the police knew or 
had reason to believe were making efforts to 
reform or stay sober. 
2. The police must have a factually-grounded 
basis for their investigation. “The police must 
be able to point to a specific reason for their 
investigation beyond a mere hunch, though this 
need not rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion as that standard is presently defined. 
For instance, the  pol ice may have a 
factually-grounded basis for their investigation 
into a suspected dial-a-dope line where they 
receive information from an anonymous 
source, such as Crime Stoppers, that a specific 
phone number is a dial-a-dope line and, 
consistent with the requirement that their 
investigation be motivated by genuine law 
enforcement purposes, they have no reason to 
believe that the  information received is 
unreliable. Acting on information received from 
an anonymous source is not the same as acting 
on a hunch.”  This provides an objective basis for 
judicial review; and
3. The police investigation must be directed at 
investigating a specific type of crime within a 
tightly circumscribed location (whether 
physical or virtual). Whether a particular type 
of location is sufficiently circumscribed for the 
purposes of a particular type of investigation will 
need to be considered on a location-by- 
location basis and the following factors may 
assist in making this determination:
• The nature and seriousness of the type of 
crime under investigation (e.g., a wider 
investigative net may be necessary to 
effectively  capture  certain types of criminal 
activity);
• The number of citizens that may be impacted 
by the investigative technique used by the 
police (e.g., a  technique that sweeps in too 
many citizens, even in a relatively small 
geographic area, may not be sufficiently 
circumscribed);
• The nature of the location under investigation 
(e.g., society may be  more  accepting of 
police opportuning in a shopping mall versus 
a residential neighbourhood or housing 
complex, even if the same number of people 
are potentially implicated in each case); and
• The intrusiveness of the technique (e.g., if the 
police are employing a more intrusive 
technique, such as a face-to-face technique, 
they may need to restrict the area in which 
they are opportuning more than if they were 
engaged in a less intrusive technique).
“The end-game of the  bona fide  inquiry prong 
remains ensuring that the police are not allowed 
to randomly test the virtue of citizens, and that 
their conduct is subject to independent and 
objective review by the courts,” said Justice 
Moldaver. ”Although this test differs from an 
analysis of whether the police met the reasonable 
suspicion standard, the judicial scrutiny it 
demands is no less meaningful.”
Using their revised approach, the  minority would 
not have found either Amhad or Williams 
entrapped. In both cases, the police were acting 
pursuant to a bona fide inquiry into the  cell phone 
numbers when they extended the opportunity to 
“The police officer’s subjective belief alone is not enough. The reasonable 
suspicion standard requires that the suspicion be based on objectively discernible 
facts. The analysis must be performed from the standpoint of a reasonable person 
‘standing in the shoes of the police officer’. Reasonable suspicion must be 
assessed against the totality of the circumstances.”
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traffic in drugs. First, there was no evidence of bad 
faith or that the police were not motivated by 
genuine law enforcement purposes. Second, the 
police had a factually grounded basis for their 
investigations having received the name and phone 
numbers of alleged drug dealers. Finally, the police 
inquiries were tightly circumscribed through a 
single phone number. The minority would have 
dismissed both appeals.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
INFORMATION OBTAINED 
BETWEEN DECISION TO MAKE & 
ACTUAL ARREST MAY BE 
CONSIDERED IN RGB ANALYSIS 
R. v. Lichtenwald, 2020 SKCA 70
Two Integrated Drug Unit detectives 
observed a man enter a wash bay at a 
self-serve car wash. The man was not 
under investigation at the time but 
one of the detectives knew the man 
from past investigations and believed he was a user 
and seller of drugs. One of the past investigations 
linked the man to the same area as the car wash. 
The officers decided to watch the man.
Shortly after the man began to clean his vehicle, 
the accused walked into the same wash bay as the 
man. The accused spoke to the man for about 30 
seconds, then left. Shortly thereafter, the man got 
into his car, left the wash bay, drove around the car 
wash, and parked his car nose  to nose with the 
accused’s vehicle in a second wash bay. The 
detectives saw the man and the accused get into 
the accused’s vehicle, briefly  face each other and 
then appear to be looking down into their laps.
The more  senior and experienced officer decided to 
effect an arrest about 30 seconds after both men 
entered the  vehicle. Police approached the 
accused’s vehicle and saw both men with their 
heads down counting cash. The accused was 
arrested at 2:57 p.m. and searched incidental to the 
arrest. Police found a folding knife and $2,310 in 
his pants pocket. His wallet and photo driver’s 
licence were also seized. A detective asked if the 
address shown on the driver’s licence was current 
and the accused confirmed that it was. The police 
searched his vehicle and found a small quantity of 
cocaine and methamphetamine in plain view on 
the  floor. They found more cocaine and 
methamphetamine , as wel l as fen tany l , 
hydromorphone, and GHB elsewhere in the 
vehicle, including in the glovebox. They also found 
an expandable  baton, a loaded handmade .22 
calibre zip gun, .22 calibre ammunition, an axe, 
and an additional $340.
The accused was given the police warning and, 
when asked if he wanted to speak to a  lawyer, said 
“yes”. However, he was not permitted to make that 
call. He was taken to the police station and held 
while the police obtained a warrant to search his 
home. The warrant was executed at 7:25 p.m. More 
GHB, scales and other paraphernalia, as well as a 
sawed-off .22 calibre rifle, a .43 calibre Walther BB 
gun, pellets, a Slavia starter pistol, four knives, a 
loaded SKS semi-automatic assault rifle and a high 
capacity magazine were found in the home. The 
accused was again read his Charter rights sometime 
after 9:30 p.m. and told he could call a lawyer. He 
said he would do so in the morning. He was 
charged with numerous drug, firearm and proceeds 
of crime offences. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued his rights under ss. 
8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter  were 
breached. He submitted that his arrest 
was unlawful under s. 495 of the 
Criminal Code. In his view, the  events observed by 
police were so innocuous that the grounds for 
arrest were not objectively reasonable. He also 
suggested that the searches of his person and 
vehicle were unreasonable, and the warrant to 
search his home was secured on information 
derived from his unlawful arrest and the warrantless 
searches. Further, he contended the seven hour 
delay in the police providing access to counsel was 
a s. 10(b) violation. He wanted the evidence 
gathered by police at the time of his arrest and from 
the search of his home excluded under. s24(2).
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The judge found the accused’s arrest was lawful. 
Both the subjective and objective elements of the 
test for reasonable grounds to believe had been 
met. The arresting officers subjectively believed 
they had reasonable grounds to arrest and those 
grounds were justifiable from an objective point of 
view. The judge found that the “vignette” the 
officers witnessed had “all the badges of a drug 
transaction”.  
The  brief exchange involving the  accused 
confirming his address before he was given his right 
to counsel was “not so much a function of police 
interrogation but incidental contact in the course of 
the arrest”. And the accused’s address was 
disclosed on his driver’s licence anyways. This 
exchange did not breach the Charter.
However, the seven hour delay in providing the 
accused access to counsel was a blatant s. 10(b) 
breach. The two excuses offered by  the Crown for 
delaying access to counsel — destruction of 
evidence and officer safety  — were rejected by the 
judge. In the judge’s opinion, there was no risk of 
communication to an accomplice that a search 
warrant was going to be issued unless the lawyer 
was part of a conspiracy to destroy evidence or 
impede the investigation. There was no suggestion 
of such a conspiracy. The concern for officer safety 
was also rejected. The police could have secured 
the home while they awaited the arrival of the 
search warrant.
Despite the s. 10(b) Charter breach, the judge failed 
to conduct a s. 24(2) analysis to determine whether 
any evidence obtained in the searches of the 
accused’s person, vehicle or home should be 
excluded. The accused was convicted of possessing 
methamphetamine, hydromorphone, cocaine, 
fentanyl and gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB) for 
the purpose  of traf f icking, traf f icking in 
methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of 
proceeds of crime, and several firearms offences. 
He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, less two 
years’ remand time.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred by failing to find a 
breach of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
r i g h t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , h e 
suggested his right to counsel was also violated 
when the police  asked him his address before 
providing him with his s. 10(b) rights. Finally, he 
submitted all of the evidence ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). 
Reasonable Grounds For Arrest
In deciding whether an officer 
has reasonable grounds for an 
arrest, Justice Barrington-Foote 
noted that the standard “does not 
mean the Crown must make out 
a prima facie case, or prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt or on a  balance of probabilities that the 
person arrested had committed or was about to 
commit an indictable offence.” Whether or not a 
“police officer’s belief is objectively  reasonable 
turns on all of the relevant facts the officer knew 
or reasonably believed to be true, even if that 
belief proves to be mistaken”. And information 
obtained by police after a decision has been made 
to arrest, but before  the arrest is actually effected, 
can be used to support the reasonable grounds for 
the arrest. “After all, it is the actual arrest that 
must be lawful and based upon reasonable 
grounds,” said Justice Barrington-Foote. “If the 
arrest was ultimately based upon such reasonable 
grounds, it should matter not whether some earlier 
police  decision to try to effect that arrest was 
based upon such grounds. Intervening events may 
“[I]t is the actual arrest that must be lawful and based upon reasonable grounds. If 
the arrest was ultimately based upon such reasonable grounds, it should matter 
not whether some earlier police decision to try to effect that arrest was based 
upon such grounds. Intervening events may well shed light on whether the arrest 
should, in fact, be carried out.”
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well shed light on whether the arrest should, in 
fact, be carried out.” 
In this case, the trial judge did not err in 
concluding  the police had reasonable grounds to 
effect the arrest. All of the circumstances included 
the accused’s approach to the other man soon after 
his arrival, the man driving to the wash bay 
occupied by the accused and parking in an unusual 
position, the  two men entering the accused’s 
vehicle, speaking to one another and then both 
looking into their laps. Plus, one of the detectives 
knew the other man to be involved in the drug 
world. “The reputation of a  suspect may be 
germane in assessing whether there were 
reasonable grounds, if that reputation is related to 
the ostensible reasons for the arrest and the police 
knowledge is based on reliable evidence, such as 
direct police knowledge of the suspect,”  said 
Justice Barrington-Foote. “All that was required was 
for [the detective] to reasonably believe that [the 
man] was involved.” A conviction was not required. 
Further, the trial judge was entitled to consider the 
officer’s training and expertise in the context of the 
evidence as a whole. Finally, the officers observed 
the men counting cash as they approached the 
vehicle  to make the arrests. This could be 
considered in assessing reasonable grounds even 
though the officers had already decided to effect 
the arrests before  they approached. This evidence 
was relevant to both the subjective and objective 
elements of the test. The officers subjectively 
believed the accused had committed or was about 
to commit an indictable offence, and their belief 
was justifiable from an objective point of view. The 
arrest was lawful. 
s. 10(b) Charter
The Court of Appeal found asking the address 
question did not breach the accused’s s. 10(b) 
Charter rights. Rather than asking the accused to 
verify his current address for the purpose of 
completing  an Information to Obtain a search 
warrant for the  accused’ s home, the police asked 
the question for administrative purposes. 
Police officers are obliged to identify a suspect 
who has been arrested. They are accordingly 
entitled to ask a suspect for their name and 
address. Indeed, there is authority for the 
proposition that suspects have a duty to identify 
themselves when they are validly arrested and 
risk conviction for obstructing a police officer if 
they refuse to do so. The fact that a suspect may 
be compelled to answer creates the basis for an 
accused person to argue that information so 
obtained can be used only for the purpose for 
which it was compelled, and that if it is used 
for another purpose — such as obtaining a 
warrant — the evidence obtained as a result of 
that misuse should be excluded as having been 
obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 7 Charter 
rights. However, [the accused] did not assert 
that the use of the answer to the address 
question in the ITO breached his s. 7 Charter 
rights. He relied only on s. 10(b).
For these reasons, and absent any evidence that 
the addres s ques t ion was a sked fo r 
investigative, rather than simply administrative 
purposes, [the officer] did not breach [the 
accused’s] s. 10(b) Charter rights by asking it. 
[references omitted, paras. 52-53]
Exclusion of Evidence
The seven-hour delay in providing  access to 
counsel was a  s. 10(b) Charter  breach. Justice 
Barrington-Foote found all of the evidence seized 
as a result of searches of the accused’s person, 
vehicle and home was obtained in a manner that 
infringed his s. 10(b) right to counsel. Although 
there was no causal connection between the 
breach and the evidence, there was a temporal and 
“The reputation of a suspect may be germane in assessing whether there were 
reasonable grounds, if that reputation is related to the ostensible reasons for the 
arrest and the police knowledge is based on reliable evidence, such as direct police 
knowledge of the suspect.”
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contextual connection which was more than 
tenuous or remote. The evidence was obtained as 
part of a continuing course of conduct or chain of 
events. The evidence was acquired in the course  of 
the arrest, which triggered the accused’s s. 10(b) 
rights, and led to the seizure of the evidence at the 
house. 
Although the Court of Appeal found all of the 
evidence was obtained in a manner that breached 
the Charter, it only excluded the evidence  found at 
the residence. The evidence found on his person 
and in his vehicle was admitted. As a result, the 
accused’s convictions related to the evidence found 
in his home were accordingly varied or set aside, 
while his convictions related to the other evidence 
were upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
TRAFFIC STOP LAWFUL DESPITE 
SUSPICION OF DRUG 
TRAFFICKING
R. v. Upright, 2020 ABCA 227
A Staff Sergeant saw a man standing 
in front of a mall as if waiting for 
someone. The man was holding a cell 
phone in each hand, talking and 
texting on both of them. The Staff 
Sergeant thought the man might be a drug 
trafficker. The man was with a woman (the 
accused), and left the mall as a passenger in her 
car. She was driving. The vehicle failed to signal 
when it left the mall parking lot and the man was 
not wearing his seatbelt. 
Hoping for a reason to stop the vehicle and allow a 
further investigation into his suspicion of the 
passenger’s drug-related activities, the Staff Sergeant 
alerted a marked patrol unit in the area to run the 
plate and initiate a traffic stop “if the opportunity 
arose”. Using the traffic infractions already 
observed by the Staff Sergeant, the patrol officers 
initiated the traffic stop. The accused and her 
passenger were asked for identification so traffic 
tickets could be issued. 
The passenger was on a recognizance prohibiting 
him from possessing a  cell phone. He was arrested 
for breach of recognizance and patted down. A 
fake firearm licence and cash were found, but no 
cell phones were located. A further search of the 
vehicle in the immediate vicinity of where the 
passenger had been sitting revealed drugs, drug 
paraphernalia related to traf f icking, and 
ammunition in a black bag positioned on the 
passenger floor of the vehicle. Two cell phones 
were also found, one under the passenger seat and 
the other in the passenger side-door compartment. 
The passenger was re-arrested and re-Chartered for 
drug offences.
While the police were dealing with the passenger 
and searching  the vehicle, the accused received 
several calls on her cell phone which she did not 
answer. This caused police to believe she might 
also be involved in drug trafficking. She was 
arrested — some 27 minutes after the initial traffic 
stop — Chartered and cautioned. A search of her 
purse incidental to her arrest revealed other drugs 
and paraphernalia including baggies and $490 in 
cash, a digital scale, a drug pipe, and a  book 
containing drug-transaction notations. The accused 
and her passenger were transported to the police 
station where they were both strip-searched but no 
further evidence was found. The accused was 
charged with drug and proceeds of crime offences.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge rejected the accused’s assertion 
that her rights under ss. 8 and 9 had been 
violated. First, the judge found the 
accused and her passenger had 
committed infractions under Alberta’s Traffic Safety 
Act (TSA) based on police  testimony and the audio-
recorded communications between officers. The 
accused failed to activate her turn signal and her 
passenger failed to wear his seatbelt. The grounds 
for the traffic  stop were rooted in statute, 
reasonable, and clearly  expressed. The Staff 
Sergeant’s underlying additional motivation or 
suspicion of drug trafficking did not invalidate the 
otherwise  lawful stop. Nor did the 27-minute delay 
while police dealt with her passenger’s arrest 
render the detention arbitrary. 
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Second, the police had the necessary reasonable 
grounds to arrest the passenger for breaching his no 
possess cell phone recognizance condition. This led 
to a lawful search of the vehicle incidental to arrest. 
Th i s inc luded sea rch ing the immedia te 
surroundings of the passenger for a purpose related 
to arrest — cell phones. The judge rejected the 
accused’s suggestion that the real motive for 
searching — drugs and not cell phones — was 
revealed by police first searching the bag on the 
floor rather than looking under the  seat or side-door 
compartment where phones were more likely to be 
found. The judge opined that it was not the  court’s 
function to state  how or in what order a police 
officer should carry out his investigative search 
provided the search was carried out in a reasonable 
manner. 
Third, the accused’s arrest was lawful. The judge 
accepted the police had the  necessary grounds to 
arrest the accused because the items discovered on 
the search incident to the passenger’s arrest were 
located close to her, she was the owner and 
operator of the vehicle, joint possession of the 
items was possible, and she received but did not 
answer numerous calls on her cellphone which, in 
the officers’ experience, was consistent with drug 
trafficking. Since her arrest was lawful, the search 
of her purse was reasonable as an incident to arrest.
Finally, the accused’s strip search was reasonable. 
She had been lawfully arrested and the police were 
searching for drugs related to the  trafficking arrest. 
As well, there were legitimate safety concerns 
because  ammunition had been found along with a 
fake firearms licence on the man. The judge 
concluded there was a “risk that a weapon or drugs 
could be concealed”.
The accused had not been arbitrarily detained in 
relation to the initial traffic stop nor had she been 
subject to unreasonable searches when the police 
subsequently searched the passenger side of her 
vehicle or her purse. The police acted within their 
statutory authority at each stage of the  traffic  stop 
and relied on lawfully obtained information as the 
encounter progressed. Nor did the strip search at 
the police station violate s. 8. She was convicted of 
possessing methamphetamine for the purposes of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in finding that her 
ss. 8 and 9 Charter had not been 
breached. She challenged the 
lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, suggesting it 
was done on a false pretext or ruse to disguise the 
true intent or motivation for the stop — to 
investigate suspicion of drug trafficking. In her 
opinion, this unlawful aim for the traffic stop 
rendered the stop unlawful even if the police also 
had a lawful traffic reason for the stop. If the traffic 
stop was unlawful, she submitted everything that 
followed was unlawful — the  cascading sequence 
of subsequent searches — and the evidence 
obtained from those searches must be excluded.
The Traffic Stop
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
argument. “It is entirely permissible  for police to 
have dual purposes in conducting a traffic stop, 
that of investigating traffic safety  violations and 
criminal offences,”  said the Appeal Court. “The 
fact that [the Staff Sergeant] suspected [the 
passenger] to be involved in drug activities and 
“It is entirely permissible for police to have dual purposes in conducting a traffic 
stop, that of investigating traffic safety violations and criminal offences. The fact 
that [the Staff Sergeant] suspected [the passenger] to be involved in drug 
activities and therefore wanted the [accused’s] vehicle stopped for traffic 
violations does not make the traffic stop illegal and therefore an infringement of 
s 9 of the Charter.”
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therefore wanted the [accused’s] vehicle stopped 
for traffic violations does not make the traffic stop 
illegal and therefore an infringement of s 9 of the 
Charter.”  
Under s. 166 of the TSA the police are authorized 
to stop vehicles and request identification to issue 
tickets for traffic violations. The patrol officers 
conducting  the stop were relying on the traffic 
infractions observed by the Staff Sergeant. The 
purpose of their stop was to issue traffic tickets. And 
they did not share the Staff Sergeant’s suspicion the 
man was involved in drug offences. The lawfulness 
of the initial TSA traffic stop was reasonably 
supported on the record. 
The Arrest 
The TSA-based detention did not evolve into a 
criminal detention of the accused until after the 
drugs and paraphernalia were  located in the black 
bag close to the accused on the passenger floor, the 
police heard her phone continuously ringing, and 
they knew she owned and operated the stopped 
vehicle. At that point she was arrested, and 
promptly Chartered and cautioned. 
As for the  27 minutes the accused was kept waiting 
while police dealt with the man and searched the 
vehicle, it was reasonably necessary so police 
could complete their investigation of the man. As 
the Court of Appeal found, “the trial judge 
properly concluded that the officers could not 
have simply allowed the [accused] to leave since 
she had not yet been given a traffic ticket and she 
was the driver and owner of the vehicle that was 
the subject of their search relating to [the 
passenger].”
The Vehicle Search
The accused argued the manner in which the 
search of the vehicle was conducted was 
unreasonable in the circumstances. In her view, the 
nature of her detention immediately changed into 
an investigative detention unrelated to the TSA 
upon the man’s arrest. This resulted in an arbitrary 
27-minute detention of her in which the police 
failed to inform her of “what they were doing” 
prior to searching the passenger side of her vehicle 
and “why they were delaying writing her a ticket”. 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. “The [accused] 
was not under investigative detention nor 
arbitrarily detained,”  it said. “It was reasonable to 
conclude ... that in the circumstances the 
[accused] was well aware that the focus had 
temporarily shifted from the TSA infractions to the 
arrest and investigation of [the man] on Criminal 
Code offences.”  The Appeal Court continued:
[T]he search of [the man’s] immediate vicinity 
in the [accused’s] vehicle was lawful. Although 
a war ran t l e s s sea rch i s p r ima f ac ie 
unreasonable, a search incidental to arrest 
qualifies as an exception to the rule, with some 
limitations. Generally, in order for a search 
incidental to arrest to be lawful, the officers 
must have been searching for purposes of 
safety, to preserve evidence, or to find evidence 
to support the arresting charge. If their search 
was for one of those reasons, it must have also 
been objectively reasonable. Searches 
incidental to arrest extend to the arrested 
person’s immediate surroundings, including the 
automobile from which the arrested person had 
exited at the time of arrest. [references omitted, 
para. 17]
“Generally, in order for a search incidental to arrest to be lawful, the officers 
must have been searching for purposes of safety, to preserve evidence, or to find 
evidence to support the arresting charge. If their search was for one of those 
reasons, it must have also been objectively reasonable. Searches incidental to 
arrest extend to the arrested person’s immediate surroundings, including the 
automobile from which the arrested person had exited at the time of arrest.”
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In this case, the Staff Sergeant saw the man with 
two cell phones in his hands. He was on a 
recognizance with a condition not to possess cell 
phones. No cell phones were found on his person 
when he was arrested. The search incidental to 
arrest that followed was for a  valid purpose — to 
search for cell phones in the bag and around the 
passenger seat where the man was sitting. The 
search incidental to arrest was also conducted 
reasonably. The searching officer limited the scope 
of the search to the  immediate vicinity of where the 
man was sitting and he did not search anywhere 
that could not have contained a cell phone. Nor 
did the  officer attempt to elicit any information 
from the accused about any aspect of the drug 
investigation while he searched the vehicle.
The Court of Appeal also agreed it was not for a 
court to dictate how or in what order a police 
officer should carry out his investigative search as 
long as it was conducted in a  reasonable manner. 
“Moreover, searching officers can subjectively 
have more than one reason for the search,”  said 
the Appeal Court, “provided one of the reasons is 
objectively justified as incidental to arrest and the 
entirety of the search can be connected to that 
reason.” 
The Strip Search
The accused argued that it was not reasonable in 
the circumstances for her to be strip searched 
because  the  trial judge’s conclusion that there was 
a “risk  that a weapon or drugs could be concealed” 
did not meet the standard of reasonable grounds 
required for a strip search. Although strip searches 
cannot be  carried out as a matter of routine policy 
due do their inherently humiliating and degrading 
nature, the trial judge did not rely on a lower 
standard in finding the circumstances justified the 
police decision to conduct a strip search. The trial 
judge found the  officers’ belief that a strip search 
was reasonable and necessary was based on the 
following:
• Drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in 
the bag in the vehicle and the accused’s purse; 
• The accused was reluctant to release her purse 
to police; 
• The accused and her passenger were left alone 
in the vehicle after the initial stop while police 
were investigating their identities; 
• The accused was left alone in the vehicle after 
the police dealt with her passenger and while 
they made a decision regarding her arrest; 
• Ammunition was found in the bag and a fake 
firearms licence was found on the man, 
suggesting the possibility of an undiscovered 
firearm; and
• While it was unclear whether the accused 
would be remanded into custody, she  was 
going to be placed in a  holding cell that could 
hold at least three  other individuals thereby 
bringing her into contact with other detainees.
“In our view, the factors relied upon by  police  and 
accepted by the trial judge were appropriate, fact-
specific considerations that justified the 
[accused’s] strip search,” said the Court of Appeal. 
“They were not impermissibly vague criteria that 
could apply to a vast category of offenders, nor 
was there a bare assertion that the [accused] 
should be searched simply because she was 
charged with drug trafficking offences.” Nor did 
the discrepancy in the Staff Sergeant’s evidence that 
drugs had been found on one of the occupants 
fatally undermine  the determination as to whether 
the strip search was justified on reasonable 
grounds. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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recruiting, transporting, 
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or distrustful of authorities or who are facing threats from the traffickers. This means that
the true scope of human trafficking in Canada is underestimated.
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DESCRIPTION OF BOOK: 
 
Vancouver’s Women in Blue is a ground breaking account of the history of the 
women who served with the Vancouver Police Department between 1904 and 1975. 
Theirs is the story of women who first joined as matrons and the slow, rather 
twisting path their role in policing travelled as it evolved into assignments as fully 
operational police constables. Set up chronologically, the chapters offer a record for 
each of the women hired, along with a brief synopsis of their careers. A sampling of 
real-life memories is also included. The story concludes with the women of 1975, as 
they were the first VPD women to become Certified Municipal Police Constables 
under the new rules regarding hiring and training of municipal police officers.  
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FOREWORD BY:   Beverley Busson, Commissioner, RCMP (retired) 
 
“For women in Canada, the long road to equality has taken countless turns. For 
many, the journey has been difficult, but the struggle has been worth it…The 
history of women in policing is one such saga. This book is a story of firsts within 
the Vancouver Police Department, and chronicles not just the names, but the lives 
of the women who dared to challenge the gender barriers before the phrase ‘glass 
ceiling’ was even coined… Their stories are ones of courage and determination...” 
 
 
 
ENDORSEMENT BY:  The Honourable Wally Oppal, QC 
 
“An excellent read; former Deputy Chief Constable Carolyn Daley’s history of the 
women in blue in the Vancouver Police Department is a story that needs to be 
told… Having spent 28 years in the force during which time she reached the level of 
Deputy Chief Constable, she is in a unique position to tell of the many challenges 
faced by women in policing… In her extremely impressive history, the former 
Deputy Chief takes her readers through the historical transformation of the 
Vancouver Police Department… A must read. 
 
 
 
A WORD FROM THE CHIEF CONSTABLE:  
 
“I believe that capturing and sharing the contribution these leading women made to 
our department will inspire future female leaders in policing.” 
 
Chief Constable Adam Palmer 
Vancouver Police Department 
 
 
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 
 
Born and raised in Vancouver, B.C., Carolyn served with the Vancouver Police 
Department from 1975 to 2003. During her career she rose through the ranks from 
Constable to Deputy Chief Constable and holds the distinction of being the first 
woman to do so. She is the author of Vancouver’s Women in Blue and holds the 
women of the VPD in high esteem. This is her tribute to their service. 
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EVIDENTIAL SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST  MUST BE  RELATED TO 
REASON FOR ARREST
R. v. Santana, 2020 ONCA 365
The accused was under investigation 
for large scale drug trafficking. Police 
learned he was in Thunder Bay 
contrary to a bail condition requiring 
him to remain in Ottawa. He was 
also wanted on two outstanding arrest warrants, 
one province-wide for driving under suspension. 
He was placed under surveillance  and police saw 
him with a woman in a vehicle. It was night and 
the vehicle’s taillights were  not working. The 
vehicle made several brief stops. Surveillance 
officers contacted the local Thunder Bay police 
office and provided a description of the accused 
and the vehicle. They asked the local police to stop 
the vehicle and advised them of the outstanding 
warrants, the bail order breach and the inoperable 
taillights. 
Thunder Bay patrol officers saw the vehicle. A  
woman was driving and a person believed to be the 
accused was sitting in the front passenger seat. The 
officers confirmed the existence of the outstanding 
warrants through CPIC and noted the rear lights 
were not functioning. They stopped the vehicle  for 
the taillight infraction and to arrest the accused on 
the province-wide warrant.
The driver was told the rear taillights were out and 
asked her to produce her relevant documents. The 
accused, who initially  falsely identified himself, 
was removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, told he 
was under arrest on the outstanding warrant and 
advised of his right to counsel. He was patted down 
and his wallet, which contained his identification, 
was located. He was then placed in the rear of a 
police cruiser. 
The arresting officer took it upon himself to return 
to the vehicle and retrieve the accused’s belongings 
since he would not be released. He saw a winter-
style jacket lying on the back floor between the two 
front seats. He assumed the jacket belonged to the 
accused because the driver had a jacket on. The 
officer removed the jacket intending to take it back 
to the police station. But before  putting the jacket 
in the police cruiser, he searched its pockets to 
check for weapons or other objects relevant to 
police safety. He found a ziplock bag containing 
495 pills believed to be Percocet (but later 
identified as fentanyl). The accused and the driver 
were arrested for trafficking in narcotics and 
advised of their right to counsel. A search 
incidental to arrest followed and police found two 
cell phones, one in the vehicle and one in the 
driver’s purse. Text messages on one of the cell 
phones was consistent with drug trafficking. 
A search warrant was later obtained to search the 
hotel room where the accused and the driver had 
been staying. In the hotel room, the police found 
thousands of fentanyl pills. The accused was 
charged with possessing fentanyl for the purpose of 
trafficking, possessing proceeds of crime and 
breach of recognizance offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer testified that he had no reason 
to either stop the vehicle or arrest the 
accused for suspected drug trafficking. 
Nor was there any reason to detain the 
female driver other than to address the Highway 
Traffic Act (HTA) violation of driving  with the rear 
lights out. Once the HTA matter had been 
adequately addressed she would be free to go. The 
arresting officer also testified that he  did not ask the 
accused if he wanted the police to gather his 
belongings from the vehicle. He removed the jacket 
anyways because he anticipated the accused would 
be held in custody overnight. He also said he was 
entitled to search the immediate area around where 
the accused had been sitting in the vehicle at the 
time of his arrest “for officer safety” even though, 
by the time he conducted the  search, the accused 
had been removed from the vehicle, handcuffed 
and placed in the back of the police cruiser with 
the intention of driving him to the police station.
The judge found there  were no Charter breaches. 
He agreed that the visual examination of the 
vehicle’s interior, the seizure  of the jacket from the 
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vehicle, and the search of its pockets before it was 
placed in the  police cruiser were all justified as a 
search and seizure incident to the accused’s arrest 
on the outstanding warrant. 
“As the [accused] was taken into custody on an 
April night in Thunder Bay, it is understandable 
that the police did not opt to leave his jacket 
behind,”  said the judge. “I find that [the arresting 
officer] subjectively had valid purposes in mind 
when he searched the jacket. Furthermore, those 
purposes were objectively  reasonable. A jacket 
could contain a weapon, or potential evidence 
related to the charges, and thus it was objectively 
reasonable to search the jacket for the purposes of 
officer safety and the discovery of evidence.” 
And, even if the judge had found a Charter breach 
he would have declined to exclude the evidence 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of 
possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking 
and sentenced to eight years in prison, less credit 
for pre-sentence custody. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
warrantless search of the 
vehicle, the seizure of the 
jacket and its search were all 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. The Crown, 
on the other hand, submitted there  was no s. 8 
violation. In its view, the warrantless search and 
seizure were lawful as an incident to the accused’s 
arrest on the  warrant. Further, even if there was a s. 
8 breach, the Crown contended the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2). 
                                                                                                                              
Seizure & Search of the Jacket
Looking inside the vehicle for the accused’s 
belongings and taking possession of the jacket 
constituted a search and seizure under s. 8 of the 
Charter. The search of the jacket’s pockets also was 
a search for s. 8 purposes. And the police were 
neither acting under consent or a warrant. 
Therefore, the Crown had the onus to show the 
searches and seizure were nonetheless reasonable.
In finding the seizure and search unlawful, Justice 
Doherty, speaking for the Court of Appeal, found it 
was not truly incidental to the accused’s arrest on 
the outstanding warrant because it was not 
conducted for a valid purpose connected to the 
arrest. When deciding whether the  purpose of a 
search was valid, a court will examine the 
following:
• the purpose  for which the officer conducted 
the search;
• whether that purpose was a  valid law 
enforcement purpose connected to the arrest; 
and
• whether the purpose identified for the search 
w a s o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e 
circumstances.
Here, the officer’s visual examination of the 
contents of the vehicle and his seizure  of the jacket 
were not lawful as an incident to the arrest. “The 
scope of the power to search as an incident to an 
arrest is fact-specific,”  said Justice Doherty. “Valid 
police purposes associated with searches 
incidental to arrest include police safety, public 
safety, securing evidence, and discovering 
“Valid police purposes associated with searches incidental to arrest include 
police safety, public safety, securing evidence, and discovering evidence. Two 
points should be stressed. First, the purpose relied on to justify the search at trial 
must have been the actual reason the police conducted the search. After-the-fact 
justifications that did not actually cause the police to conduct the search or 
seizure will not do. Second, the police purpose must be related to the specific 
reason for the arrest.”
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evidence. Two points should be stressed. First, the 
purpose  relied on to justify the search at trial must 
have been the actual reason the police conducted 
the search. After-the-fact justifications that did not 
actually cause the police to conduct the search or 
seizure will not do. Second, the police purpose 
must be related to the specific reason for the 
arrest.”
In this case, the accused had been arrested on a 
province-wide warrant for driving while  under 
suspension. Any search for evidence had to be 
evidence in relation to his arrest on the outstanding 
warrant. The search could not be undertaken for 
evidence connecting him to other possible offences 
such as drug trafficking. But there was no evidence 
the arresting  officer was searching for evidence that 
would confirm either the existence of the 
outstanding warrant, or the identification of the 
accused as the person named in the warrant. Thus, 
an evidence gathering purpose provided no 
justification for the  visual search of the vehicle, the 
seizure of the jacket, or the search of it.
Nor was there any authority for the officer to 
visually  inspect the inside of the vehicle for 
property belonging to the accused and, if any 
property was located, to seize it and take it to the 
police station. Again, the officer was not looking  for 
evidence related to the reason for the arrest. Nor 
did he have a reason to believe any officer or 
member of the public was in danger from anything 
in the vehicle. “Clearly, the [accused] posed no 
danger as he was in handcuffs in the back of the 
police  cruiser,” said the Court of Appeal. There was 
no possibility  the accused would be released and 
allowed to return to the vehicle. He was in the 
police cruiser and was going to be taken to the 
police station and held in custody. 
Had the  Court of Appeal found looking in the 
vehicle and seizing the jacket were lawful, a search 
of the  jacket pockets before it was placed in the 
police cruiser would have been justified for 
legitimate  safety  concerns associated with the 
possession and control of jacket. But since the 
visual search of the interior of the vehicle  and the 
seizure of the jacket from the vehicle were not 
incidental to arrest, the  subsequent search of the 
pockets of the jacket could not be incidental to that 
arrest either. “[The officer] wrongly believed he 
was entitled to seize the [accused’s] property 
because the [accused] was under arrest and was 
being taken back to the police station,“  said the 
Court of Appeal. “By unlawfully  searching the 
vehicle and taking possession of the jacket, [the 
officer] created a justification for the search of the 
pockets of the jacket before it was placed in the 
police cruiser.”
Other Valid Reason?
“There are circumstances when the police arrest a 
person in a vehicle in which the police are 
authorized, indeed required, to take control of, 
and responsibility for the vehicle  and its contents,” 
said Justice Doherty. “In those circumstances, the 
police  are  also sometimes authorized to itemize 
and secure the contents of the vehicle.” But those 
circumstances did not exist in this case:
The Thunder Bay police had no intention of 
taking control of the vehicle when [the officer] 
went looking for the [accused’s] belongings and 
seized the jacket. To the knowledge of [the 
officers], the woman driving the vehicle 
would be on her way, wherever she was 
going, once the Highway Traffic Act 
matter had been addressed. The police 
had no authority to prevent the driver 
from leaving with the vehicle after the 
Highway Traff ic Act matter was 
completed. Equally, the police had no 
power to itemize the contents of the 
Jeep or, more specifically, to look for, 
and take possession of, the [accused’s] 
personal property in the Jeep. If [the 
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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arresting officer] was concerned about the 
[accused] losing track of his property, or being 
cold while in custody, [the officer] could have 
offered to collect the [accused’s] belongings 
from the Jeep for him.  [para. 33]
The arresting officer did not act lawfully when he 
visually examined the interior of the vehicle, seized 
the jacket, and searched it. His actions constituted 
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of 
s. 8 of the Charter.
s. 24(2) Charter
Justice Doherty described the effect of the 
unconstitutional seizure of the accused’s jacket on 
subsequent police conduct as follows:                        
In this case, the breach of the [accused’s] s. 8 
rights led directly to the discovery of the pills in 
the jacket pocket. That discovery led 
immediately to the arrest of the [accused] and 
the driver on drug trafficking charges. Without 
the pills, that arrest would not have occurred. 
The arrest, in turn, led to further searches which 
yielded cellphones that ultimately led to 
evidence consistent with drug trafficking. 
Without the illegal seizure of the pills, there 
would have been no arrest on drug trafficking 
charges, and no search of the cellphones. 
Lastly, the discovery of the pills in the jacket 
played a prominent role in the police obtaining 
a search warrant for the [accused’s] hotel room. 
That search yielded thousands of pills. [para. 
47]
Since the  trial judge did not adequately address the 
effect of the unconstitutional seizure  of the 
accused’s jacket on subsequent police conduct., 
the Court of Appeal concluded it could not 
determine whether the evidence seized from the 
vehicle, the jacket, and the hotel room, should be 
excluded under s. 24(2). “On this record, the court 
cannot, with any confidence, make the findings 
necessary to put sufficient meat on the evidentiary 
bones so as to properly perform a s. 24(2) 
analysis,” it said. A new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SWABBING DOOR HANDLE 
REQUIRES WARRANT
R. v. Wawrykiewycz, 2020 ONCA 269
Police initiated a drug  trafficking 
investigation of the accused while  he 
was on bail for numerous drug and 
weapons charges. As part of their 
surveillance, police saw him park the 
car he was driving in a public place and go into a 
restaurant. While the accused was in the restaurant, 
a police officer swabbed the exterior driver’s side 
door handle of the car. The officer then cleaned the 
swabbed surface and took an additional swab as a 
control sample. Surveillance continued and, when 
the accused parked his vehicle again, the police 
took another swab of the driver’s side door handle. 
The three swabs were analyzed using an ion 
scanner and tested positive for cocaine. 
In conjunction with other information including 
surveillance observations, the police used the 
cocaine positive ion scan results in an information 
to obtain (ITO) three warrants: (1) to search his 
residence, (2) a storage unit and (3) his car. In the 
ITO, the affiant said the  control sample may have 
tested positive because the door handle was not 
adequately cleaned, the texture/nature of cocaine 
or the door handle, or there was so much cocaine 
saturation that residue remained. When police 
executed the warrant they found cocaine, 
methamphetamine, cutting agents, a cocaine press, 
ammunition and other drug paraphernalia in the 
storage unit. In the bedroom of his home police 
located $100,000 in cash while they recovered 
cocaine and a cutting agent from his car. The 
accused was charged with several offences 
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including multiple counts of possessing both 
cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Among other things, the accused argued 
the ion swab results ought to have been 
excised from the ITO because the taking 
of the  swabs was a warrantless search that 
breached s. 8 of the Charter. In his view, the 
warrants should not have been issued and therefore 
their execution violated s. 8 and any evidence 
obtained as a result was inadmissible under s. 
24(2). 
The judge dismissed the accused’s application for 
exclusion. Although she found the swabbing was a 
search, the police were authorized to conduct the 
swabs under the ancillary powers doctrine. She 
analogized warrantless ion swabbing to the 
warrantless use a drug-sniffing dog on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion. Reasonable  suspicion based 
swabbing was an acceptable standard because it 
was minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted, and 
contraband-specific. Further, the impact on privacy 
was even lower than using a drug-sniffing  dog since 
swabbing provided no information about the 
interior of a vehicle and there was no potential for 
embarrassment or delay to the accused. Moreover, 
the police had an important purpose (investigating 
cocaine trafficking) and covert swabbing was an 
important investigative  tool that allowed police to 
test for the presence of illegal drugs without risking 
disclosure of the investigation. Thus, the ion swab 
results did not need to be excised from the ITO. The 
warrants were valid and, even if they were not 
lawfully obtained, the trial judge would have 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of drug related offences and 
sentenced to six years in prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the swabbing of his car was an 
unreasonable search and seizure 
under s. 8 of the Charter and 
should have been excluded from the ITO. In his 
view, the trial judge mistakenly focussed on the 
purpose of the swabs and ignored the possibility 
that his DNA could have been collected in 
assessing his reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
submitted the swabbing of his vehicle involved a 
much greater privacy interest than a dog sniff 
because  of the potential collection of biological 
information. He contended that the reasonable 
suspicion standard was not sufficient. Furthermore, 
even if reasonable suspicion was the threshold, the 
accused argued that the police did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that he was involved in drug 
offences at the time of the swabs  
Swabbing Vehicle Door Handle
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  swabbing 
of the door handles from the car the accused was 
driving, even while  parked in public, and analyzing 
those swabs using special equipment required prior 
judicial authorization. Reasonable suspicion was 
not legally sufficient. Justice Pardu, speaking for the 
unanimous Appeal Court, stated:
  
Here the [accused] had some expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle. Although the vehicle 
was owned by his father, he was using it and 
had the ability to regulate access to it, and 
there is no suggestion he abandoned his 
privacy interest. By parking the vehicle in a 
public lot, he would reasonably expect that 
others, including police, would make 
observations of the car. Police could 
legitimately observe physical damage to the 
car, or evidence on its exterior such as blood 
spatter, without prior judicial authorization.
Source: York Regional Police Facebook post 
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I would not conclude that any physical contact 
by the police with the car is necessarily a 
violation of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. An officer might, for example, place a 
hand on the hood of a car to determine 
whether it is warm, that is, to determine 
whether the vehicle has recently been driven. 
This evanescent contact is not far beyond the 
casual contact patrons of a parking lot might 
incidentally have with other vehicles.
However, I would hold that taking samples of 
residue left by a suspect’s hands on the handles 
of a vehicle, and subjecting those samples to 
chemical analysis, is an intrusion for which a 
warrant should be required. This investigative 
technique can reveal “intimate details of the 
l i festyle and personal choices of the 
individual.” These swabs presumably revealed 
whether the [accused] had handled cocaine. I 
also agree ... that privacy concerns are 
heightened because the swabs may also 
provide DNA samples for analysis by police, 
even if that is not why they were initially 
collected, or what they were used for. ... 
[references omitted, paras. 40-42]
“Though the vehicle was in public view, any 
residue left by the [accused’s] hands was not 
observable to a passerby and was in this sense 
private,”  said Justice Pardu. “[The accused] had an 
objective and subjective reasonable expectation of 
privacy  in the car, and more particularly, in the 
residue left by his hands on the handles of the car 
he was using. Given the privacy interests in the 
material transmitted from the [accused’s] hands to 
the door handles, and given the degree of 
intrusion, sampling, and analysis, this is not a 
search for which reasonable suspicion could 
substitute for prior judicial authorization”. Since 
the search was warrantless, it was  presumptively 
unreasonable. 
Here, however, the Crown failed to rebut the 
presumption. The bodily residue had not been left 
on abandoned personal property, on public 
property, or on someone else’s property. Nor was 
there  any suggestion that exigent circumstances 
existed to justify the warrantless search.
Nevertheless, even if the door handle swabbing 
analysis was excised from the ITO,  there remained 
a sufficient basis upon which the search warrants 
could have been obtained. And the evidence 
obtained from the searches of the accused’s home, 
storage unit and car was admissible under s. 24(2). 
First, the ion swab was not a  serious breach. The 
police acted in good faith and fully  disclosed their 
actions in the ITO. And the  law at the time was not 
clear about whether such a swab was a search or 
whether a  warrant was required. Second, the ion 
swab involved an exterior door handle. The 
information obtained was focused and narrow. The 
information was not highly personal, the accused 
was not present when the swab was taken, and he 
did not suffer stigma or embarrassment. Finally, the 
evidence was highly reliable, the drugs found could 
seriously impact a community and the charges 
were serious.  The trial judge considered the proper 
factors under s. 24(2) and her decision to admit the 
evidence was owed considerable deference. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[The accused] had an objective and subjective reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the car, and more particularly, in the residue left by his hands on the handles 
of the car he was using. Given the privacy interests in the material transmitted 
from the [accused’s] hands to the door handles, and given the degree of 
intrusion, sampling, and analysis, this is not a search for which reasonable 
suspicion could substitute for prior judicial authorization.”
“[T]aking samples of residue left by 
a suspect’s hands on the handles of 
a vehicle, and subjecting those 
samples to chemical analysis, is an 
intrusion for which a warrant 
should be required.”
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CANADA’s TOP COURT MORE 
DIVIDED ON CASES
In its report, “2019 Year in 
Review”, last years’ workload of 
Canada’s highest Court was 
outlined. In 2019 the Supreme 
Court heard 69 appeals. This is up 
from the  66 appeals it heard in 
2018. The most appeals heard 
annually in the last 10 years was in 
2014 when 80  cases were brought 
before the Court. The  lowest number of appeals 
heard in a single year during  the last decade was 63 
in both 2015 and 2016.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a  case was 5.3 months, up 
from 4.8 months in 2018 and 4.6 months in 2017. 
The shortest time within the last 10 years for the 
Court to announce its decision after hearing 
arguments was 4.1  months (2014) while the longest 
time was 7.7 months (2010). Overall it took 15.8 
months in 2019, on average, for the Court to render 
an opinion from the time an application for leave to 
hear a case was filed. This is down from the previous 
year when it took 17.0 months. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2019 there were 552 applications for leave, 
meaning a party sought permission to appeal the 
decision of a lower court. This represents 68  more 
applications for leave  than 2018 and 60 more than 
2017. Ontario was the source of most applications 
for leave at 167  cases. This was followed by Quebec 
(132), British Columbia  (77) the Federal Court of 
Appeal (58), Alberta (55), Manitoba (17), 
Saskatchewan (16), Nova Scotia (11) New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador each 
with six  (6), the Yukon (4) and Prince Edward Island 
with two (2). No applications for leave came from 
the Northwest Territories or Nunavut. Of the known 
outcomes for leave applications, only 36  or 7% 
were granted while 9 were pending. Of all 
applications for leave, 21% were criminal in nature.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 69 appeals heard in 2019, Quebec had the 
most of any province  at 21. This was followed by 
Ontario (17), British Columbia (8), Alberta (7),  the 
Federal Court of Appeal (4), Manitoba (4), Nova 
Scotia  (3), Newfoundland and Labrador (3), 
Saskatchewan (1), and the Yukon (1). None of the 
appeals heard originated from New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories, or 
Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2019, 
43%  were criminal. Thirty 
nine percent (39%) were non-
Charter  criminal law cases 
while 4%  were Charter 
criminal cases. 
Twenty five  (25) of the 
appeals heard in 2019 were as of right. This source 
of appeal includes cases where  there  was a  dissent 
on a  point of law in a provincial court of appeal. 
Twenty (20) of these 25 cases were  criminal in 
nature.  Ontario had the most appeals as of right 
(10), followed by British Columbia  (4), Quebec (4), 
Alberta (3), Saskatchewan (3) and Manitoba (1).
Appeal Judgments 
There were 72 appeal judgments released in 2019, 
up from 64 the previous year. Twenty five (25) 
decisions were delivered from the bench while the 
remaining 47 were delivered after being reserved. 
Thirty  nine (39) appeals were allowed while 33 
were dismissed. Twenty  two (22) appeal decisions 
were on reserve as at December 31, 2019. 
In terms of unanimity, the judges of the Supreme 
Court all agreed in only 42%  of its cases. This is the 
lowest percentage of 
unanimity in the last 10 
years. This is down 
significantly from the 
Court’s 79% agreement 
i n 2 0 1 4 . F o r t h e 
remaining 58% of its 
judgments released in 
2019 the Court was 
split. 
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Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Additional years’ statistics obtained from Supreme Court of Canada - Statistics 2005 to 2015.
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISIONS: SPLIT v. UNANIMOUS
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CONTINUED DETENTION 
JUSTIFIED: 
NO s. 9 CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Bejarano-Flores, 2020 ONCA 200
Late at night a  customer in a 
university campus food court told an 
employee that he had seen a person 
with a gun. The employee, who did 
not have a description of the suspect, 
told university security  who, in turn, called 911. 
Two police officers in separate cars immediately 
responded to the gun report, a high priority call. 
The gun suspect was described as male, Black, 
early 20’s, 5’ 6’’, medium build, and wearing a dark 
blue or black baseball hat, a black hoodie with the 
hood pulled over the 
cap, grey  sweatpants, 
and a black jacket. 
University security 
saw a male matching 
the gun suspect get 
into an orange and 
green Beck taxi van. 
The taxi then went 
mobile. 
Police followed the same route as the taxi van that 
was reported by university security  and saw an 
orange and green Beck taxi van. There were few 
other vehicles on the road. The officer was sure that 
the taxi van he saw was the same one that 
university security reported seeing the gun suspect 
enter about four minutes earlier. As police got 
closer to the taxi van, a  single passenger was seen 
inside. Police decided to stop the taxi van and 
investigate. One officer went to the rear passenger 
door and the other went to the driver. As soon as he 
got to the taxi van, an officer opened the passenger 
door and saw that the accused was the lone 
passenger. He was seated in the middle row of the 
van on the passenger side. The accused was asked 
to step out. As he did so, police saw he was the 
same gender, age, height, and build as the 
suspected gunman (male, in his 20’s, 5’ 6”, and of 
medium build). However, he appeared to be 
Hispanic and not Black. 
The officer told the accused he was being 
investigated because a person with a gun had 
boarded an orange and green taxi van. The officer 
conducted a brief pat down search of the accused’s 
person, looking for a weapon. He noticed the 
accused’s clothing, while similar to the description 
of the gun suspect’s clothing, did not match. No 
gun was found on the pat-down and the search was 
over in less than a  minute. A different police officer 
who arrived on scene looked inside the taxi van’s 
open door and saw a knapsack between the bucket 
seats in the middle of the van. He picked it up and 
thought its weight was consistent with it containing 
a firearm. He opened the knapsack and looked 
inside. No gun was found but a clear ziplock bag 
containing 29.28 grams of MDMA was found. A 
further visual search of the interior of the passenger 
area of the  taxi van was conducted but no gun was 
located. The knapsack and interior of the passenger 
area search took about one minute.  
The accused was arrested for drug possession. He 
then said he also had drugs in his jacket pocket and 
turned a further bag of MDMA weighing 27.89 
grams over to police. The period from the initial 
stop of the taxi van to when the accused was 
arrested was about two minutes. He was charged 
with possessing  MDMA for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer stopping the accused testified 
that he identifies as Hispanic. He 
described the accused’s skin tone as 
“medium” and “a little darker”  than his 
own. As for the suspect description provided, he 
said that stress and a host of other factors can 
impair a witness’ ability to accurately observe and 
retain information. As well, he said that he was less 
concerned about the accused’s non-matching 
clothing  because it was not uncommon for suspects 
to change or discard pieces of clothing to avoid 
police detection. He realized that the clothing the 
accused was wearing was different from that given 
for the gun suspect, although he felt it was similar.
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The accused asserted that his ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
rights had been violated. Although he agreed that it 
was objectively reasonable for the police  to 
conclude that the taxi van was connected to the 
gun call,  he submitted that his continued detention 
after he exited the taxi van was not justified. In his 
view, once it was apparent to the officer that he did 
not match the  broadcasted description of the gun 
suspect the police had no grounds to detain him 
further and they had to stop their search efforts.
The judge ruled that the police had reasonable 
grounds to suspect, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the accused was the individual 
connected to the gun call they were investigating 
and the continued detention of him, after the initial 
stop, was justified. The officer did not fail to turn his 
mind to the non-matching physical descriptors and 
the judge accepted the officer’s explanation for why 
he reasonably suspected that the accused was the 
gun suspect despite the non-matching descriptors.  
The judge found there were multiple physical 
descriptors and the accused matched several of 
them; the vehicle description was distinctive and a 
match; and the geographical and temporal 
connections were relevant and accurate. In the 
judge’s view, the grounds for the accused’s initial 
and continued detention were objectively 
reasonable.
The officer had 18 years of police experience and 
based his decision to detain on the  physical 
descriptors that did match; the vehicle was a taxi 
van (which was rare for that area and no other taxi 
vans had been observed in that area that night); the 
last known location of the taxi van was very 
specific and consistent with his initial observations 
of the vehicle and the location of the vehicle stop; 
the traffic stop took place within just a couple of 
minutes of the last reported observation of the  taxi 
van by university security; and there was a single 
male passenger inside the taxi.   
The judge held the pat down search was reasonable 
and did not breach s. 8 of the Charter. A search 
incident to investigative detention is anchored in 
preserving safety  from immediate danger. The 
police were responding to a 911 gun call and had 
ample grounds to suspect the accused was the 
individual that had been seen with a gun. The 
immediate  concern for officer safety and the safety 
of others was “self-evident”. The police had quickly 
located and stopped the taxi van and it was 
reasonable for police  to conclude that the accused 
would still have had access to the firearm. The 
danger to safety was immediate and the brief, non-
intrusive pat down was lawful.
The knapsack search, however, was unlawful. The 
judge concluded that removing the driver from the 
taxi van or seizing the knapsack, without searching 
it, would have alleviated all immediate safety 
concerns. Nevertheless, the judge admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). First, the police acted in 
good faith and the breach was on the less serious 
end of the spectrum. Second, the impact of the 
brief and circumscribed knapsack search on the 
accused’s privacy interest in its contents was 
minimal. Finally, the drugs were reliable evidence, 
the charges were serious and the  drugs were 
essential to proving the Crown’s case. The accused 
was convicted of possessing MDMA for the 
purpose of trafficking and possessing the proceeds 
of crime. He was sentenced to 14 months in jail. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing the trial 
judge erred in f inding his 
continued detention was lawful. 
In his view, once he emerged from the taxi and the 
officer saw he appeared to be Hispanic, not Black, 
the police  no longer had grounds to continue with 
his detention. Furthermore, he wanted the evidence 
excluded under s. 24(2), his convictions set aside 
and acquittals entered. 
A police officer may detain an 
individual for investigative purposes 
if there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect, in all the circumstances, that 
the individual is connected to a 
particular crime and such a detention 
is necessary.”
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The Continued Detention
Justice Gillese, delivering the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, concluded that the experienced police 
officers in this case  had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the  accused was the gun suspect. And 
this was a dangerous and dynamic situation where 
public safety concerns were paramount. The Appeal 
Court described the legal principles governing 
investigative detention as follows:
A police officer may detain an individual for 
investigative purposes if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect, in all the circumstances, 
that the individual is connected to a particular 
crime and such a detention is necessary.
...
The reasonable suspicion threshold respects the 
balance struck – in this case under s. 9 of the 
Charter – by permitting law enforcement to 
employ legitimate but limited investigative 
techniques. Reasonable suspicion derives its 
rigour from the requirement that it be based on 
objectively discernible facts that can then be 
subjected to independent judicial scrutiny. This 
scrutiny is exacting and must account for the 
totality of the circumstances.
While reasonable grounds to suspect and 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe are 
similar, in that both must be grounded in 
objective facts, reasonable suspicion is a lower 
standard as it engages the reasonable 
possibility, rather than probability, of crime . 
The fact that reasonable suspicion deals with 
possibilities, rather than probabilities, 
necessarily means that in some cases the police 
will reasonably suspect that innocent people 
are involved in crime. However, the suspicion 
cannot be so broad that it descends to the level 
of generalized suspicion.
Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against 
the totality of the circumstances. The inquiry 
must consider the constellation of discernible 
facts that are said to give the investigating 
officer reasonable cause to suspect that an 
individual is involved in the type of criminal 
activity under investigation. This inquiry must 
be fact-based, flexible, and grounded in 
common sense and practical, everyday 
experience. Reasonable suspicion need not be 
the only inference that can be drawn from a 
particular constellation of factors. Exculpatory, 
neutral or equivocal information cannot be 
disregarded when assessing a constellation of 
factors.
The requirement for objective and ascertainable 
facts as the basis for reasonable suspicion 
permits an independent after-the-fact review by 
the court and protects against arbitrary state 
action. The onus is on the Crown to show that 
the objective facts rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion, such that a reasonable 
person, standing in the shoes of the police 
officer, would have held a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.   
To be constitutionally sound, the inference of 
reasonable suspicion must be grounded in 
objectively discernable facts known to the 
police and tied to both the individual being 
“While reasonable grounds to suspect and reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe are similar, in that both must be grounded in objective facts, reasonable 
suspicion is a lower standard as it engages the reasonable possibility, rather than 
probability, of crime . The fact that reasonable suspicion deals with possibilities, 
rather than probabilities, necessarily means that in some cases the police will 
reasonably suspect that innocent people are involved in crime.”
“To be constitutionally sound, the 
inference of reasonable suspicion 
must be grounded in objectively 
discernable facts known to the police 
and tied to both the individual being 
detained and the specific offence 
being investigated.”
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detained and the specific offence being 
investigated. [references omitted, paras. 51-57]
And further:
... I remind myself that in determining whether 
there are objective facts that rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion, the court must conduct 
an exacting scrutiny. However, while probing, 
the judicial inquiry must be fact-based, flexible, 
and grounded in common sense. As well, it is 
important to recall that reasonable suspicion 
need not be the only inference that can be 
drawn from a particular constellation of factors. 
[para. 68]
Here, a reasonable person standing in the officer’s 
shoes would have had a reasonable suspicion that 
the accused was the  gun suspect when assessed 
against the totality of the circumstances:
In this case, the [accused] matched four key 
characteristics of the gun suspect – gender, age, 
height and build. It is true that the [accused] 
appeared to be Hispanic, rather than black, as 
the gun suspect had been described, and that 
his clothing was also different from that given 
for the gun suspect. But [the officer]did not 
disregard these non-matching physical 
descriptors. He explained why they did not 
detract from his certainty that the passenger in 
the Beck taxi van was the gun suspect and his 
explanation was found to be reasonable by the 
trial judge. The matching four physical 
characteristics, the distinctive features of the 
Beck taxi van, the absence of other such 
vehicles in the vicinity, and the temporal and 
geographical connections between the Beck 
taxi van and the gun sighting are objectively 
discernible facts to be understood within the 
context of a 911 gun call. The police were 
faced with a dangerous and dynamic situation 
in which public safety was the paramount 
concern. In my view, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, the [accused’s] continued 
detention was objectively reasonable. [para. 
69]
There was no s. 9 Charter violation.
Exclude or Admit the Evidence?
Since the continued detention was lawful, the 
Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge’s s. 24(2) 
analysis. The evidence obtained as a result of the s. 
8 breach in relation to the search of the knapsack 
was admissible.
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“Every road you take has a 
destination. What road are you on 
and will it take you where you really 
want to go?”
~unknown~
“[I]n determining whether there are objective facts that rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion, the court must conduct an exacting scrutiny. However, 
while probing, the judicial inquiry must be fact-based, flexible, and grounded in 
common sense. As well, it is important to recall that reasonable suspicion need 
not be the only inference that can be drawn from a particular constellation of 
factors.”
Charter of Rights
s. 9 Everyone has the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained 
or imprisoned. 
Volume 20 Issue 3 ~ May/June 2020
PAGE 37
ADMINISTRATIVE ALCOHOL & 
DRUG RELATED DRIVING 
PROHIBITIONS
B C ’s I m m e d i a t e 
Roadside Prohibition 
(IRP) program was 
introduced in 2010. 
Under this program, 
police may issue a 3, 
7, 30 or 90-day 
prohibition at the 
roadside to alcohol-affected drivers under B.C.’s 
Motor Vehicle Act. 
A police officer will issue an IRP when a driver has 
care or control of a motor vehicle, and following a 
demand to provide a breath sample on an 
Approved Screening Device (ASD): 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.05 (50mg%) BAC (the “Warn” range) 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.08 (80mg%) BAC (the “Fail” range) 
• if the driver fails or refuses to comply with a 
breath test without a reasonable excuse. 
For the 3 or 7 day  IRP, a police officer may decide 
to impound the driver’s vehicle. For 30 or 90 day 
IRP’s, vehicle impoundment is mandatory.  
Administrative Driving Prohibitions
An Administrative Driving Prohibition (ADP) is a 90 
day driving prohibition served on drivers who 
provide a breath test into an approved instrument 
such as an Intoxilyzer. 
If a  driver’s breath sample indicates a BAC above 
0.08 (80mg%), or if the driver refuses to provide a 
sample of breath, police may issue a  90-day 
“Notice of Driving Prohibition” and may also 
charge the driver under the Criminal Code. A driver 
served with an ADP has a 21-day period before the 
prohibition takes effect. 
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
1st incident
3 days
3 days
(officer discretion)
$200
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
2nd incident
within 5 years
7 days
7 days
(officer discretion)
$300
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
3rd incident
within 5 years
30 days
30 days
$400
FAIL
BAC over .08
90 days
30 days
$500
or REFUSE
ASD Result
Incident
IRP Length
Vehicle Impound 
Length
Administrative 
penalty
IMMEDIATE ROADSIDE PROHIBITIONS
Source: Immediate Roadside Prohibition Fact Sheet
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BC’s ALCOHOL DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
Immediate Roadside Prohibitions Administrative Driving Prohibitions
Warn 90 Days 90 Days Total
IRP & 
ADPYEAR 3 day
IRP
7 day
IRP
30 day
IRP
FAIL REFUSE Total
IRP
FAIL
Alcohol
Breath/Blood
REFUSE Total
ADP
2011 7,874 154 7 13,190 1,446 22,671 1,900 520 2,420 25,091
2012 5,392 222 12 6,784 1,161 13,571 3,576 696 4,272 17,843
2013 6,066 309 30 11,577 1,414 19,396 1,021 340 1,361 20,757
2014 5,702 368 26 11,240 1,470 18,806 1,049 352 1,401 20,207
2015 4,670 351 32 9,288 1,863 16,204 1,127 481 1,608 17,812
2016 4,588 334 33 8,864 1,830 15,649 1,127 464 1,591 17,240
2017 4,243 259 19 8,389 1,715 14,625 1,067 419 1,486 16,111
2018 4,736 293 23 9,209 1,710 15,971 1,021 377 1,398 17,369
2019 5,034 315 27 9,124 1,680 16,180 954 348 1,302 17,482
Source: Alcohol Driving Prohibitions
Fatal Victims in Crashes where Alcohol was Deemed a Contributing Factor
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fatal 
Victims 103 129 114 128 102 92 111 68 49 52 59 61 52 64 51
There were 100 fatal victims from January - September 2010 and 11 from October - December 2010.
The IRP program was implemented on September 20, 2010.
Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle Fatalities
RoadSafetyBC has released a  report on acohol-related motor 
vehicle (MV) fatalities. The report suggests that there was an 
immediate  and sustained reduction in alcohol-related motor 
vehicle fatalities since  the IRP program was implemented. in 
September 2010. 
“In the final three months of 2010, the MV fatalities related to alcohol for the province were reduced by 
58%, from an average of 26 to 11,” noted the report. “This reduction has continued from 2012 through 
2018 with there being 50% fewer alcohol-related fatalities since the introduction of the IRP.”
Source: Report on Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle (MV) Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Related Crashes, Injuries and 
Fatalities: 10-year Statistics for British 
Columbia 2009-2018
RoadSafetyBC has released its report on Motor 
Vehicle  Related Crashes, Injuries and Fatalities. This 
report presents preliminary  police-reported data on 
motor vehicle  crashes in BC for the ten year period 
from 2009-2018. 
POLICE REPORTED FATALITIES & CHARACTERISTICS
Year Total 
Fatalities
Fatalities:
Speeding
Fatalities:
Inattention /
Distracted 
Driving
Fatalities:
Driver Error / 
Confusion
Fatalities
Impairment
Environmental Road Types
Provincial
Highway
City/
Municipal 
Street
Rural 
RoadTotal  Alcohol Drug
2009 363 133 99 90 106 92 30 67 202 133 28
2010 364 113 102 100 127 111 35 60 222 111 31
2011 292 98 79 60 75 68 16 61 164 103 25
2012 281 100 80 46 57 49 16 72 146 110 25
2013 269 77 77 56 64 52 23 47 139 116 14
2014 289 81 66 54 65 59 13 77 154 111 24
2015 295 89 89 63 72 61 17 67 162 115 18
2016 288 92 80 56 67 52 24 53 149 126 13
2017 281 72 73 58 72 64 25 52 172 85 24
2018 282 73 68 68 59 51 13 56 161 100 21
FATALITIES BY SPEED LIMIT or AT INTERSECTION
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
30 km/h or less 3 3 5 11 6 2 4 4 6 2
40-60 km/h 160 118 105 116 112 95 107 126 90 99
70-90 km/h 110 152 86 82 86 95 81 88 95 82
100+ km/h 72 62 65 50 48 70 83 57 72 81
At Intersection 85 62 66 77 79 49 73 85 57 68
Not At Intersection 274 296 216 192 185 238 215 203 221 210
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FATALITIES BY OCCUPANT TYPE
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Driver 223 207 161 145 149 161 163 172 180 173
Passenger 70 92 65 59 49 64 52 37 51 48
Cyclist 10 6 7 11 13 6 12 10 4 7
Pedestrian 58 58 57 65 52 55 66 65 44 51
Other 2 1 2 1 6 3 2 4 2 3
Total 363 364 292 281 269 289 295 288 281 282
FATALITIES BY GENDER
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Male 257 239 200 189 174 202 208 190 195 213
% Male 71% 66% 68% 67% 65% 70% 71% 66% 69% 76%
Female 106 125 90 92 92 87 86 97 86 69
% Female 29% 34% 31% 33% 34% 30% 29% 34% 31% 24%
Unknown 0 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 0 0
Total 363 364 292 281 269 289 295 288 281 282
FATALITIES BY AGE GROUP
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Under 15 8 14 9 10 7 9 5 5 8 5
15-24 64 60 54 49 42 41 46 49 31 47
25-34 51 54 42 40 48 42 37 51 51 45
35-44 57 47 32 37 31 25 46 24 44 41
45-54 69 71 44 43 36 40 42 38 31 36
55-64 43 46 44 29 37 49 45 52 49 46
65-74 20 25 24 28 30 29 29 28 27 23
75+ 51 43 38 41 35 49 43 38 35 35
Unknown 0 4 5 4 3 5 2 3 5 4
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2020 BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Parade participants to form up at 12:00 noon in the 
800 block of Government Street, Victoria, BC.
Parade will step off at 12:40 pm
OTHER WEEKEND EVENTS
7TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT
Date: Friday, September 25, 2020
Format: Texas Scramble
Time: 11:00 am Registration / 1:00 pm Shotgun Start
Location: Bear Mountain Golf & Country Club, 1999 Country Club Way, Victoria, BC
7TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RIDE TO 
REMEMBER
Date: September 24-26, 2020
2ND ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RUN TO 
REMEMBER
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2020
BCLEM MEET & GREET
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2020       6:00 PM to 10:00 PM    
click here for more info
Sunday, September 27, 2020 at 1:00 pm 
BC Legislature, Victoria, BC
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BC ILLICT DRUG TOXICITY 
DEATHS IN 2020
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January 1, 2010 to May 31, 
2020. In May 2020 there were 170 suspected drug 
toxicity deaths. This represents a +93%  increase 
over the number of deaths occurring in May 2019 
and a +44% increase over April 2020. 
In 2019, there were a total of 979  suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This was a decrease of -566 
deaths over the 2018 numbers (1,546). 
Overall, the 2019 statistics amount to about 2.7 
people dying every day of the year.
People aged 30-39 were the hardest hit in 2019 
with 273 illicit drug toxicity deaths followed by 
40-49 year-olds (215) and 50-59 years-old (212). 
People aged 19-29 had 173 deaths while 60-69 
year olds had 90 deaths. Vancouver had the most 
deaths at 245 followed by  Surrey (119), Victoria 
(61), Abbotsford (45), Kelowna (33), Burnaby (31), 
Kamloops (27) and Nanaimo (27).   
Males continue to die at a 4:1  ratio compared to 
females. From January to May 2020, 442  males had 
died while there were 112 female deaths.
The overall 2019 data 
indicated that most illicit 
drug toxici ty  deaths 
(87%) occurred inside 
while 12% occurred 
outside. For 10 deaths, 
t h e l o c a t i o n w a s 
unknown. 
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“ P r i v a t e 
residence” includes residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 50 months preceding the 
declaration (Feb 2012-Mar 2016) totaled 1,701. 
The number of deaths in the 50 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-May 2020) totaled 
5,346. This is an increase of more than 200%.
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Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2010 to May 
31, 2020.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. May 27, 2020.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2019 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 82.8%  of deaths, cocaine (50.0%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(33.6%), ethyl alcohol (27.7%), heroin (15.2%) and methadone (6.7%). Other opioids (17.6%) and other 
drugs (16.2%) were also detected. 
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ILLICT DRUG TOXICITY DEATHS:
MODE OF CONSUMPTION
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for the modes of consumption for 
completed toxicity cases from January 1, 2016 to 
December 31, 2019. 
In 2019, smoking (40.1%) and injection (24.6%) 
were the most common modes of consumption, 
followed by intranasal (19.8%) and oral (10.2%). 
Mode of consumption could not be determined for 
21.4% of cases. In some cases, more than one 
mode of consumption was used. Therefore, 
percentages will add up to more than 100%.
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BC SUICIDE DEATH RATE 
DROPS SLIGHTLY 
The BC Coroners Service has released statistics for 
suicide deaths in the province from 2008-2018. In 
2018 the suicide death rate per declined to a five 
year low. In 2018, the suicide death rate was 11.5 
per 100,000 population, down from 11.6 in 2017. 
From 2008-2018, the  most common means of 
suicide for females was poisoning (37%), followed 
by hanging (32%). For males, the most common 
means of suicide was hanging (41%) followed by 
firearms (19%). Overall, the most common means 
of suicide death in 2018 were hanging, firearm and 
poisoning. Vancouver, Surrey and Victoria were the 
three  townships experiencing the highest number of 
suicides in 2018.
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SUICIDES BY GENDER
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Male 397 423 393 384 382 488 469 449 430 424
% Male 78% 79% 75% 75% 73% 76% 76% 74% 75% 74%
Female 113 110 134 128 143 156 147 154 142 150
% Female 22% 21% 25% 25% 27% 24% 24% 26% 25% 26%
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 510 533 527 512 525 644 616 603 572 575
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MEANS OF SUICIDE DEATHS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Hanging 203 207 196 193 189 258 216 240 231 228
Poisoning (Alcohol/Drugs/Other) 103 98 102 98 92 121 120 113 86 70
Firearms 70 79 67 78 86 82 103 87 97 78
Fall 38 47 36 57 48 53 56 48 54 36
CO Poisoning 28 28 26 15 21 37 29 22 13 16
Airway Obstruction 17 24 33 31 25 24 31 32 16 19
Stabbing / Incised Injuries 19 14 28 12 30 27 21 16 20 15
Drowning 9 12 15 9 8 15 17 15 15 7
Motor Vehicle 7 5 11 8 9 6 4 9 3 5
Railway 1 4 5 3 3 5 4 6 3 4
Fire 5 5 2 4 5 5 2 2 1 3
SkyTrain 3 3 2 1 3 4 3 3 5 2
Exposure: Cold 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0
Electrical 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Other 4 6 3 2 4 4 4 2 1 3
Under Investigation 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 26 89
Total 510 533 527 512 525 644 616 603 572 575
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
10-18 19-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+
16
39
54
84
767166
18
59
18
44
18
2725
4
Female Male
2018 Suicide Deaths 
by Age Group and 
Gender
Volume 20 Issue 3 ~ May/June 2020
PAGE 48
“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly 
receiving the In Service: 10-8 
newsletter by email. You can sign up 
by clicking here. This will take you to 
the free Subscription Form that only 
requires an email. 
Also 
visit 
the 
online 
archive.
